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The importance of human capital for economic growth was highlighted
in much of the “new growth theory” that came to prominence in the late
1980s and early 1990s. The neoclassical growth model, formalized three
decades earlier, had focused on the accumulation of machinery and equip-
ment and emphasized the feature of diminishing returns—which implied
that such investment would not be able to drive long-run growth. The new
generation of studies switched attention to the accumulation of human
capital and the possibility that returns to investment in education, training,
and research may not suﬀer from diminishing returns.
There is an important distinction between embodied and disembodied
human capital. Human capital in the form of abilities and skills is embod-
ied inasmuch as it lives and dies with particular people. We invest in human
capital not only through formal education and training programs but also
through experience on the job and through domestic and social interac-
tion. The time and eﬀort devoted to parenting, for example, represents an
enormous investment in the human capital of the next generation.
The accumulation of abilities contributes both to psychic rewards and to
marketed economic activity. Whereas the value of the former is hard to
measure, there are relatively straightforward ways for us to measure the lat-
ter. Economists are only just beginning to address seriously the task of
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Council for ﬁnancial assistance.evaluating nonmarket activities such as domestic labor—see, for example,
Folbre and Nelson (2000) and Apps and Rees (2001). I focus in this paper
on market-related returns to human capital because we do not yet have in-
ternationally standardized valuations of nonmarket activities.
The most extensively documented feature of embodied human capital is
the relationship between education and wages. Studies of earnings in ad-
vanced capitalist economies typically ﬁnd that each extra year of school-
ing raises earnings by 5 to 10 percent. These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by Aus-
tralian studies such as those by Miller, Mulvey, and Martin (1995), who
analyze earnings of twins and ﬁnd that the return to a year of education lies
between 4.5 percent and 8.3 percent, and Preston (1997) who reports high
rates of return to advanced educational qualiﬁcations. The results of Mil-
ler, Mulvey, and Martin are particularly interesting because they control
for the inﬂuences of genetic and domestic background to identify the di-
rectcontribution of education—following studies by Ashenfelter and Krue-
ger (1994) and Ashenfelter and Rouse (1997, 1998) that estimate U.S. rates
of return between 9 and 16 percent.
This evidence leads us to expect that, if the average educational attain-
ment of the working-age Australian population were to rise by one year,
real gross domestic product (GDP) should rise by up to 8 percent. This in-
crease in the level of GDP will, typically, take place gradually. An increase
in the length of schooling of teenagers will only increase the average edu-
cational experience of the adult population as the new, better-educated co-
horts enter the workforce, replacing older cohorts. We expect the transi-
tion to last four decades, if people enter the labor force aged twenty and
exit at an age of about sixty. If this is so, the annual growth rate of GDP will
be 0.2 percentage points above trend during the transition period, result-
ing in an overall 8 percent increase, after which time the growth rate will re-
vert to trend—with, perhaps, some lagged adjustment to the stock of phys-
ical capital. In this sense, changes in educational investment are predicted
to have growth eﬀectsin the short run (albeit a short run of forty years), but
only level eﬀects in the long run.
This is the conventional approach, which treats human capital as an in-
vestment good in much the same way as a farmer might consider investing
in tractors. There are, however, features of human capital that can give it a
much more important role in economic development. This is particularly
true when we turn our attention to disembodied human capital, the realm
of knowledge and ideas that do not live and die with their inventors but can
be transmitted freely between people and carried forward over genera-
tions.
A crucial economic attribute of disembodied human capital, highlighted
in recent models of endogenous growth, is that ideas are both nonrival and
cumulative. Nonrivalry implies that once the idea of using electronic cir-
cuits to carry out binary computations has been announced, people can
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person’s use of the idea does not prevent another person from using it at
the same time. Moreover, ideas are cumulative: The idea of electronic com-
puting has lead to the idea of quantum computing, which may in turn lead
to yet further ideas.
Analysis of these attributes of nonrivalry and cumulative feedback has
led growth theorists to speculate that investment in the generation of ideas
can be the engine of long-run growth. The nonrivalry of knowledge also
leads us to expect market failure. When others reap the beneﬁts of some-
one’s new ideas, market forces alone are unlikely to generate the optimal
level of investment in knowledge—implying a need for government sub-
sidy.
If the generation of disembodied human capital—ideas/technology—is
the engine of growth, we should expect to ﬁnd that embodied human cap-
ital—skills and abilities—also aﬀect long-run growth. Ideas do not repro-
duce themselves without the input of highly skilled researchers. Perhaps of
equal importance, the more skilled the workforce, the better it is able to ab-
sorb, implement, and adapt the new ideas emanating from the research and
development (R&D) sector. To the extent that technological change is en-
dogenous, we expect educational attainment to have long-run growth
eﬀects in addition to the conventional prediction of level eﬀects.
In the following sections I review and evaluate evidence from recent the-
oretical and econometric studies relating economic growth to investment
in both embodied and disembodied human capital. I restrict my attention
on the empirical front to the relatively well-documented areas of invest-
ment in formal schooling and R&D, noting that this omits potentially im-
portant areas of investment in health and in informal education and train-
ing that takes place within the family and within the workplace.
1.1 Rethinking Economic Growth: The Role of Knowledge
Knowledge is fundamental to economic progress. Our material standard
of living would be reduced to unrecognizable levels if we were to suﬀer col-
lective amnesia—forgetting that a circular shape reduces friction, not re-
membering how to read and write, losing all knowledge of electrodynam-
ics. All economic activities depend on institutions that encourage the
preservation, transmission, and development of knowledge.
This seems blindingly obvious. Yet for several recent decades, the eco-
nomic analysis of growth was dominated by an approach that sidelined the
role of knowledge. Economists concentrated on the accumulation of ob-
jects rather than the accumulation of ideas.
The object-oriented approach to economic growth was formalized in
1956 by two economists operating at opposite ends of the globe: Robert
Solow at MIT in Cambridge and Trevor Swan at ANU in Canberra. Their
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the same way, leading to similar conclusions. Accumulation of capital—
machinery, buildings, equipment, and the like—is the engine of growth in
the short run. Policies that increase the share of resources going to invest-
ment will raise the productive capacity of the economy. But as the growth
of the capital stock outpaces the limited resources of land and labor, the
impact of each successive unit of investment is diminished. However large
the boost to the investment rate, growth will eventually revert to some ﬁxed
rate determined by exogenous technological progress.
This implication of the neoclassical growth model is illustrated in ﬁgure
1.1. A boost to investment at time T0 raises the rate of growth (the slope of
the logarithmic output line) from the solid line A to the dashed line B. Ul-
timately, however, growth reverts to the exogenous rate, where line B be-
comes parallel to line A, albeit with output and incomes at a higher level
than would have obtained at the lower investment rate. Tax incentives, or
other policies that inﬂuence investment, aﬀect only the level of output, not
the long-run rate of growth.
The key to this conclusion is the assumption of diminishing returns to
capital accumulation. Underlying this notion is the idea of capital as a col-
lection of similar objects. A self-employed dressmaker who purchases his
ﬁrst sewing machine will register a large increase in annual output. Pur-
chase of a second machine will reduce the amount of downtime when the
ﬁrst machine is under repair, but the consequent addition to annual output
is relatively small. A third machine would probably be redundant. This as-
sumption about diminishing returns is typically captured in growth mod-
els by postulating an aggregate production function of Cobb-Douglas
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Fig. 1.1 The impact of increased investment in the neoclassical and endogenous
growth modelsform exhibiting constant returns to scale, where output per unit of labor at
time t, yt, is related to the net capital stock per unit of labor, kt, as:
(1) yt   At(kt) 
The elasticity of output with respect to capital, represented by the pa-
rameter  , is assumed to be less than unity. The parameter Atrepresents the
level of technology at time t, sometimes referred to as total factor produc-
tivity.















which, given   1, diminishes toward zero as capital intensity increases.
1.1.1 The Revolution in Growth Theory: Endogenous Growth
This way of thinking about economic growth was challenged in a series
of papers, starting with Paul Romer in 1986, heralded as “the new growth
theory” or “endogenous growth theory.”1 A prominent feature of this new
wave of economic models—indeed, their deﬁning feature—is that policy
intervention and the nature of institutions can inﬂuence the long-run
growth rate of the economy.
In terms of ﬁgure 1.1, the new models suggest that policy or institutional
change, instituted at time T0, could permanently alter the slope of the
growth path, as illustrated by the dotted path C.
There are various technical features of these models that make it feasi-
ble for the long-run growth rate to be determined endogenously—that is,
determined by economic behavior that is analyzed within the model. One
possibility arises where the degree of substitutability between capital and
labor is suﬃciently high that returns to the accumulation of capital do not
diminish to zero.2 We can imagine that this might be the case in some man-
ufacturing processes where human labor is readily replaced by robots, or
in the delivery of some ﬁnancial services such as ATM banking. But it is
not clear that this robotic model of growth is applicable to all sectors of the
economy.
More interesting, to my mind at least, are models of endogenous growth
that build on the economic properties of complementarity, dynamic feed-
back, and nonrivalry in investment. These are the properties that distin-
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1. The key papers are Paul M. Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Rebelo (1991), and
Aghion and Howitt (1992). Paul Romer (1993) acknowledges the intellectual debt due to
Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter, Arthur Lewis, and others. Further important contribu-
tions, analyzing specialization, have come from Australian economists: Yang and Borland
(1991), Borland and Yang (1992), and Shi and Yang (1995).
2. This possibility was canvassed by the Australian economist John Pitchford (1960), who
illustrated his argument using a constant elasticity of substitution production function.guish the accumulation of ideas and skills from the accumulation of ob-
jects. It is worthwhile considering each of them in turn.
1.1.2 Complementarity of Investment
Complementarity arises when your investment increases the return
(monetary and/or psychic) to my investment. This may occur when we in-
vest in activities that exhibit network externalities. Learning to play chess,
to speak Esperanto, or to read and write becomes much more rewarding
for me if others invest in the same skills. Complementarity is not exclusive
to investment in human capital; the beneﬁts I get from investing in a tele-
phone line and a fax machine are also enhanced when others do the same.
But complementarity is probably more pervasive in the accumulation of
skills than in the accumulation of objects. Indeed, such complementarity is
an essential ingredient of the development of “social capital.”
Complementarity is a feature of the endogenous growth model of Lucas
(1988), where the productivity of any worker is enhanced not only by his or
her individual level of skill but also by the average skill level among their
fellow workers. This implies that the economic analysis of external eﬀects
is relevant to growth. Although my productivity depends in part on your
human capital, I cannot expect you to take that into account when you de-
cide how much education and training to undertake—and vice versa. So if
we make individual decisions about the time and money we spend on edu-
cation and training, we are likely to underinvest. It follows, from Lucas’s
analysis of such externalities, that there may be an important role for gov-
ernment to play. Subsidizing education will improve economic welfare in
the sense that everyone will be better oﬀas a result of an increase in human
capital.3
1.1.3 Dynamic Feedback
These education externalities are not, however, suﬃcient in themselves
to drive long-run growth. In Lucas’s model, the rate of output growth is
still limited by diminishing returns to the accumulation of both physical
and human capital. He endogenizes growth by appealing to another fea-
ture of education: dynamic feedback. As we learn more, it becomes easier
to acquire further knowledge and skills. An obvious example is reading.
Once we have learned this skill, the acquisition of further information and
skills is facilitated through book learning.
This view of dynamic feedback can be represented by a function ex-
pressing the change in the level of human capital in some representative
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3. This is not the only reason for subsidizing education. Given that many parents are con-
strained in ﬁnancing their children’s education, there are both equity and eﬃciency reasons
for public support.household as a function of the amount of adult labor time, Lh, that is de-
voted to education (of self or of children) and the current level of human
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The extent of dynamic feedback is captured by the value of the expo-
nential parameter  . A value of zero implies that there is no feedback. Ag-
gregate output per person, y, now depends on both physical and human
capital per person:
(4) yt   A(kt) (ht) ,
where we maintain the assumption of diminishing returns by restricting  ,
  1.
Endogenous growth is made feasible by the existence of positive feed-
back in the second sector of this economy, the education sector. To demon-
strate this, take logarithms of equation (4), diﬀerentiate with respect to














































Whether or not the accumulation of human capital can drive long-run
growth is determined by the ﬁnal term in this equation. With no positive
feedback (i.e., if   0), this term diminishes to zero as the level of human
capital, ht, increases over time. (This is exactly what happens to the physi-
cal capital term, as a given investment rate leads to slower and slower pro-
portional growth in the stock.) But if there is suﬃciently high feedback in
human capital accumulation (i.e., if   1), the ﬁnal term in equation (5) is
a positive constant. That is to say, the long-run growth rate is positive.
Moreover, it is increasing in the amount of labor time that is devoted to ed-
ucation.
Given suﬃcient dynamic feedback, public subsidy of education and
training can increase long-run growth. In the presence of positive exter-
nalities, or other sources of market failure, such policy will also increase
economic welfare.
1.1.4 Embodied or Disembodied Human Capital
Is it reasonable, however, to suppose that the feedback eﬀect is suﬃ-
ciently strong to make education the engine of long-run growth? Note that
even if the feedback parameter is close to unity—say,   0.9—the long-
run rate of growth in equation (5) will diminish to zero as the level of hu-
man capital increases. Stable long-run growth requires a parameter value
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man capital. Human capacities to think, organize, and remember are, how-
ever, usually presumed to be ﬁnite. Moreover, our skills and abilities die
with us and have to be replaced in every successive generation.4
In addressing the problem of limits to human capabilities, Paul M.
Romer (1990) emphasizes the distinction between the skills and abilities
that are embodied in individual humans, and disembodied knowledge. He
focuses on the properties of the latter category, the world of ideas and re-
search, supposing that there is suﬃcient dynamic feedback in the research
sector to generate endogenous growth and that the scope for developing
new ideas is limitless.
In Romer’s model, it is the number of people engaged in research and de-
velopment that drives long-run growth. His mathematical representation
of the generation of new ideas (or blueprints for new products) is similar to






t      LAAt,
where Atrepresents the number of productive ideas that have been realized
at time t in history, and the diﬀerential, dA/dt, is the current output of new
ideas from the research sector. LArepresents the amount of human capital,
or the number of researchers, devoted to innovation.
Crucially, Romer assumes that the rate of innovation is directly propor-
tional to the extant stock of knowledge. This is the “standing on shoulders”
hypothesis of knowledge accumulation, so labelled by Charles Jones
(1998), in reference to Isaac Newton’s disclaimer: “If I have seen farther
than others, it is because I was standing on the shoulders of giants.”
In the accumulation of disembodied ideas, rather than embodied skills,
it is indeed plausible to suppose that the level of current output might be
directly proportional to the size of the stock. The more ideas and theorems
that we have to draw on, the easier it is to generate new ones. Moreover,
ideas do not necessarily disappear when their developer dies: They can
typically be recorded and transmitted at minimal cost.
Implicit in Romer’s formulation of research output is the idea that there
is an evenly distributed and inﬁnite universe of potential ideas waiting to
be discovered. Thus, a given amount of research eﬀort will produce a pre-
dictable number of new ideas. A more realistic approach, allowing the dis-
covery rate to ﬂuctuate, is summarized by Aghion and Howitt (1998) in
their discussion of general-purpose technologies stemming from innova-
tions such as the steam engine, the electric dynamo, and the computer.
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4. Lucas (1988) asserts that his model of endogenous growth can be sustained across gen-
erations if a child’s initial endowment of human capital is proportional to the level already at-
tained by the adults—but, unless Lysenko was correct, the genetic transmission of acquired
human capital is unlikely.1.1.5 Nonrivalry of Ideas
As well as hypothesizing dynamic feedback in the generation of new
ideas, Romer emphasizes that ideas have another signiﬁcant economic
property, nonrivalry. Objects are usually rival, meaning that if you are us-
ing something, I cannot use it at the same time. But this is not true of ideas.
Once the binomial theorem has been published, your use of it does not in
any way interfere with my use of it.
Of course, people can try to stop others from making use of patented
ideas. But the excludability of ideas depends on the actions of people sup-
ported by institutions of laws and property rights, rather than nonrivalry,
which is an inherent feature of ideas.
Romer makes use of this distinction by assuming that ideas are fully ex-
cludable in their application to the production of goods. For example, a re-
searcher can acquire full patent protection for the design of a new drug; it
can only be manufactured if royalties are paid. On the other hand, she has
no protection against other researchers who can reverse engineer her ideas
and come up with their own diﬀerent but improved drug design. Indeed,
when the original researcher ﬁles her patent, she has to describe her idea,
thereby providing her rivals with a free input into their subsequent re-
search.
Romer’s hypothesis that ideas are nonrival and nonexcludable in the re-
search process has important implications for public policy. Researchers
may reap the beneﬁts from the direct application of their ideas, but they do
not receive monetary reward from others who “stand on their shoulders.”
Left to the market, there will be an undersupply of research eﬀort. Public
intervention is required to subsidize research, hence to stimulate growth,
up to the socially optimum level.
Other aspects of knowledge accumulation are analysed by Aghion and
Howitt (1992, 1998), who emphasize the Schumpeterian notion of “cre-
ative destruction.” Patent rights may bestow monopoly power on the pro-
ducer of a particular generation of an innovative good, but they cannot
prevent the development by a rival of the next generation of goods that are
superior in quality and/or price. The creation of the improved version de-
stroys the ﬂow of proﬁts to the previous monopolist. Unbridled competi-
tion in such a market can lead to too much research being carried out,
where the research is concerned with marginal quality improvements
rather than new products and processes. Nevertheless, such research is still
capable of driving long-run economic growth.
1.2 The Cambridge Counterrevolution
The intellectual euphoria of endogenous growth theory was challenged
by a group of economists, mostly connected with or based in Cambridge,
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laureate Robert Solow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Solow (1994) himself is critical of the knife-edge assumption required to
generate stable long-run growth in the models of Romer and Lucas. His
point is that these models require the dynamic feedback parameter in the
education/research sector to be exactly equal to unity. If we look back to
Lucas’s model, where the growth rate of the economy is determined by
equation (5), we can see that a value of 0.9 for the parameter   will, even-
tually, reduce growth to zero: The ﬁnal term of that equation has ht
1–  in the
denominator, which drives the term to zero as human capital, ht, rises if  
is less than one. Stable long-run growth requires that the parameter be ex-
actly one.
Romer (1994) has argued that this knife-edge property can be overcome
in a more complex model. More damaging to the endogenous growth
cause, however, has been the empirical work of another Cambridge (Har-
vard)–based economist, Greg Mankiw. In a much-cited paper—Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992)—he and his coauthors do not tackle the endoge-
nous growth modelers head-on. Rather, they steal the ball of human capi-
tal from the endogenous growth scrum and use it to reconstruct the 1956
Solow model.
Their “augmented Solow model” includes human capital as a third fac-
tor in the aggregate production function, alongside capital and unskilled
labor. They investigate the relationship between steady-state levels of out-
put and the three inputs, using secondary-school enrollment rates as a
proxy for the rate of investment in human capital. They conclude that the
factors are of approximately equal importance—that is, that the elasticity
of output with respect to each factor is approximately one-third—and that
together they account for 80 percent of the observed variation in 1985 in-
come levels across some ninety-eight nations.
This was a neat sidestep, rather than a direct hit on endogenous growth
theory. There was no attempt to directly confront the two models with a
discriminating statistical test, but the 1956 model was eﬀectively rehabili-
tated—even though the econometric evidence is likely to be ﬂawed due to
the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Moreover, this was only half-
time in the comeback match. In an equally inﬂuential second half, the
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) paper provided a clever reinterpretation
of an empirical regularity. Studies of postwar economic growth had typi-
cally reported a conditional convergence eﬀect. These studies ran regres-
sion models of the form
(7) (ln yiT   ln yi0)    0   ln yi0   gXi   εi,
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of y, output per capita (or
per worker), over a period of T years. Xi represents a vector of additional
explanatory variables. “Conditional convergence” is said to exist if the re-
18 Steve Dowrickgression parameter,  , is negative—a lower starting value for y is associ-
ated with a higher subsequent rate of growth, conditional on the X vari-
ables that explain diﬀerences in rates of growth.
Previous authors5 had interpreted conditional convergence as evidence
that technological spillovers from the most advanced economies enabled
less advanced economies to imitate and thus enjoy relatively fast produc-
tivity growth. The Mankiw-Romer-Weil reinterpretation of such evidence,
echoed by their Harvard colleagues Robert Barro and Jeﬀrey Sachs,6 in-
volves treating the X variables as determinants of the neoclassical steady
state, rather than the long-run growth rate. They then interpret the initial
income variable (ln y0) as a measure of distance from steady state and the
 -coeﬃcient as a measure of the speed of convergence to steady state.
This reinterpretation of the evidence in favor of the neoclassical model
has been complemented by the more direct approach of MIT graduate
Charles Jones.7 He highlights the fact that endogenous growth models
based on the accumulation of knowledge, such as Romer’s model, typically
suggest that the rate of growth should be an increasing function of the re-
sources devoted to R&D.8 He cites evidence from the United States that
contradicts this prediction: “Since 1950, the fraction of the labour force en-
gaged in formal R&D has increased by almost a factor of three. Despite
these changes, average growth rates . . . are no higher today than they were
from 1870 to 1929” Jones (1998, 157).
Jones also criticizes some of the key assumptions underpinning the
knowledge-based models of endogenous growth. In particular, he suggests
that knowledge creation may become more diﬃcult over time as the easy
ideas are discovered ﬁrst, leaving subsequent researchers with a pool that
has been “ﬁshed out.” He also suggests that researchers may often dupli-
cate each other’s eﬀorts, “stepping on toes” rather than “standing on
shoulders.”
These critiques of endogenous growth theory seem to imply that policies
aimed at increasing investment in education and/or research will not be
successful in raising the rate of economic growth for a sustained length of
time. I will argue in the next section of the paper that this is not necessar-
ily the case.
1.3 Reconciling Conﬂicting Theories of Growth
A crucial diﬀerence between the neoclassical and new growth theories
concerns the question of whether the long-run rate of growth of the econ-
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5. For example, Abramovitz (1986) and Dowrick and Nguyen (1989).
6. See Barro and Lee (1994) and Sachs and Warner (1997).
7. See Jones (1995a,b).
8. However, Aghion and Howitt (1998) show that their Schumpeterian model of endoge-
nous innovation can be adapted to eliminate the scale eﬀect.omy is some exogenous constant or whether it can be inﬂuenced by public
policy. Put another way, the question is whether policies and institutions
that inﬂuence the rate of accumulation of physical and/or human capital
have long-run eﬀects on the level of economic activity or on its rate of
growth.For purposes of practical policy making, however, this distinction
may be relatively unimportant—if the long run never arrives. Looking
back to ﬁgure 1.1, if economies are subject to shocks of suﬃcient magni-
tude and frequency, it may be diﬃcult, if not impossible, to tell whether
the long-run growth path really looks like path B or path C. In the short
run—between time T0 when the ﬁrst major shock occurs and some time
T1 when another such event occurs—the paths may be virtually indistin-
guishable.
The evidence of the neoclassical revivalists can be interpreted to sup-
port this view. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995), and Sachs and Warner (1997) all report growth regression evidence
suggesting that the rate of convergence toward steady state is of the order
of 2 percentage points per year, implying that it will take more than thirty
years for a country to halve the gap between its current income and the
steady-state level.9 Within a half-life of several decades, we must surely ex-
pect that there will be changes in investment rates and changes in the rate
of technological progress such that the neoclassical economy is rarely able
to get close to steady state.
A useful way to think of this problem is to consider the speciﬁcation of
the Error Correction Model (ECM). The ECM is commonly used to de-
compose macroeconomic time series into cyclical and long-run compo-
nents and to test for long-run cointegrating relationships. A typical regres-
sion is of the form
(8) (ln yt   ln yt 1)    {Xt   Xt 1}   [lnyt 1    Zt 1]   εt,
where y represents real output and the dependent variable is the growth
rate of output. The explanatory variables are segregated. The X variables,
which inﬂuence short-run movements, are entered in ﬁrst diﬀerences. The
Z factors are entered as lagged variables, along with the lagged value of
output, yt–1. For analysis of the long-run path, the ﬁrst diﬀerences are set to
zero, yielding the long-run path for output as a function of the Z variables:
(9) ln yT∗    ZT∗
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9. Subsequent studies on panel data have estimated higher speeds of convergence: In par-
ticular, Islam (1995) and Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1997) estimate annual convergence rates
up to 9 percent and 30 percent respectively. But Dowrick and Rogers (2002) show that these
studies confound the eﬀects of neoclassical convergence—due to diminishing returns to in-
vestment—with the eﬀects of international technology diﬀusion. Separating out these eﬀects,
they ﬁnd that the half-life of neoclassical convergence is more than ﬁfteen years.This very general empirical speciﬁcation is consistent with both exoge-
nous growth and endogenous growth models. If the Z vector contains a
time trend, T, the regression coeﬃcient on T is an estimate of the exoge-
nous rate of technological progress—as in the neoclassical model. How-
ever, the Z vector may equally well contain the time trend interacted with
another variable, such as the level of human capital. If so, the coeﬃcient on
this term captures the impact of human capital on the long-run growth rate
of the economy—as predicted by some endogenous growth models.
In the ECM framework, the sign of the regression coeﬃcient   indicates
whether output converges to the long-run path. The square brackets in
equation (8) capture last period’s deviation from the long-run path. The
negative value of   indicates the proportion of last period’s “error” that is
“corrected” in the current period.
A typical time series study that is trying to identify breaks in trend
growth, using thirty to forty annual observations, might ﬁnd a half-life for
the business cycle of two to three years.10 In this context, the “trend”
growth is approximated by the average growth rate over one or two de-
cades, averaging out ﬂuctuations over three or four business cycles. But if
convergence to the neoclassical steady-state growth path has a half-life
of thirty years, this time scale is clearly insuﬃcient to capture the under-
lying long-run rate of growth. Rather, we are identifying changes in the
slope of the transitional growth path.
This supposition is conﬁrmed by the recent study of Jones (2001). He
adopts a modiﬁed growth accounting approach to analyze the last ﬁfty
years of U.S. growth. He ﬁnds that only one-ﬁfth of the actual growth rate
of labor productivity (averaging 2.0 percent per year) has been attributable
to exogenous technical change. The remaining four-ﬁfths of growth (1.6
percent per year) is attributable to continued growth in education and re-
search intensity. In his terms, “Transition dynamics associated with edu-
cational attainment and the growth in research intensity account for 80
percent of growth” (p. 23).
Jones’s conclusion is couched in the language of the neoclassical ap-
proach. Sustained growth above steady-state levels can only be transitional
and is driven by sustained (but ultimately bounded) growth in the share of
GDP going to investment in human capital. An alternative interpretation
of the same evidence might claim that increased investment in human cap-
ital has raised the long-run endogenous rate of growth.
Evidence that reconciles the two approaches to understanding growth
comes from Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), who carry out econometric esti-
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10. A pooled time series cross-section study by Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1997), allowing for
heterogeneity in country-speciﬁc time trends, has estimated convergence in the Solow-Swan
model to have a half-life of 2.5 years. I interpret this as a failure to distinguish the speed of
transition to steady state from the ﬂuctuations of the business cycle.mation on various models to explain variation in twenty-year growth rates
(1965–85) on a cross section of seventy-eight countries. In their preferred
model, technological progress is the sum of two components: an exogenous
component, as in the neoclassical model, and a semi-endogenous compo-
nent, related to the rate of absorption of technology from the technologi-
cal leading country, captured by an interactive term between the produc-
tivity gap and the level of human capital. Their preferred model draws on
the analysis of Nelson and Phelps (1966).
They report that the interactive term is statistically signiﬁcant, support-
ing the idea that there is an endogenous component to technological prog-
ress. At the same time, they estimate an output elasticity close to 0.5 forphy-
sical capital, suggesting diminishing returns to investment and a slow rate
of convergence toward the steady-state capital stock.
Broadly similar results are reported by Dowrick and Rogers (2002). Our
study diﬀers from that of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) in that we carry out
the analysis on a panel of growth data. This enables us to test for country-
speciﬁc eﬀects. We also use an instrumental variable estimator to control
for reverse causation between growth and the explanatory variables. Coun-
try-speciﬁc eﬀects, which we interpret as endogenous components of tech-
nical progress, are found to be important. We conﬁrm the ﬁnding that the
level of human capital facilitates technological catch-up, especially among
the middle-income and richer countries.
These models combine features of the neoclassical theory with the new
growth theory. Changes in the rate of physical investment have, ultimately,
only level eﬀects; however, within a time frame of one or two decades this
is indistinguishable from a growth eﬀect. At the same time, countries have
diﬀerent rates of technological progress with an endogenous component,
dependent on the stock of human capital and the allocation of resources to
research, and a semi-endogenous component, dependent on the rate of
technological change at the frontier and on the country’s ability to absorb
ideas from abroad.
1.4 Evidence on Education and Growth
Some of the earliest studies that investigated the link between education
and economic growth were conducted by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)
and Barro (1991). They examined variations in school enrollment rates, us-
ing a single cross section of both the industrialized and the less-developed
countries. Both studies concluded that schooling has a signiﬁcantly posi-
tive impact on the rate of growth of real GDP. They interpreted this as ev-
idence of changes to (short-run) transitional growth paths. Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) also investigated the impact of educational expenditures
by governments, ﬁnding that they have a strong positive impact. Using in-
strumental variable techniques to control for simultaneous causation, their
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the order of 20 percent.11
A series of subsequent studies made use of panel data, examining
changes over time in both education and growth. Several of these panel
studies—including Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Islam (1995) and Caselli,
Esquivel, and Lefort (1996)—failed to detect any signiﬁcant relationship
between the rate of increase of educational capital and the rate of economic
growth. They suggested that the positive ﬁndings of the earlier cross-
section studies were due to omitted variable bias, failing to control for
country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
More recently, a third generation of studies has suggested a number of
reasons why the negative ﬁndings of previous panel studies might have
been biased. Pritchett (2001) has argued that poor policies and institutions
have hampered growth in many of the least developed economies, direct-
ing skilled labor into relatively unproductive activities, hence disrupting
the statistical relationship between education and growth in samples that
include less-developed economies. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) suggest
that the problem of unobserved variation in educational quality is exacer-
bated in panel data. Taking data quality into account, they show that in-
creases in the stock of schooling do improve short-run economic growth.
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) conﬁrm that direct measures of labor force
quality, from international mathematics and science test scores, are
strongly related to growth. Temple (2001) ﬁnds that growth eﬀects are pos-
itive but nonlinear. These nonlinear eﬀects may be missed by studies that
impose linearity.
Overall, it seems that studies that pool the least and the most developed
economies do not ﬁnd consistent and robust relationships between educa-
tion and growth. For evaluation of Australian policy, it is probably more
useful to examine studies that are restricted to Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies.
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) estimate the determinants of coun-
tries’ steady-state income levels as a function of investment in both physi-
cal and human capital. For their cross section of OECD countries, they es-
timate an elasticity of 0.76 between steady-state output and the proportion
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11. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) report an increasing marginal eﬀect on growth of years
of schooling, but this may be due to a lack of variation in the data on primary enrollments.
More surprising is their ﬁnding that positive growth eﬀects are conﬁned to male education.
On the other hand, a study by Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) uses a more sophisticated
panel estimation technique (general method of moments) and reverses the result—it is female
secondary education rather than male education that promotes growth. This ﬁnding is con-
ﬁrmed by Knowles, Lorgelly, and Owen (2002). These contradictory results probably reﬂect
strong colinearity between female education, male education, and other measures of devel-
opment, such as life expectancy and fertility, which are included in the regressions. Moreover,
where many women are involved in domestic rather than market economic activity, the edu-
cational enhancement of their contribution to economic welfare may not be picked up di-
rectly by standard measures of GDP.of the workforce enrolled in secondary school. Translating the elasticity
into the marginal impact of an additional year of schooling in OECD
countries (where average schooling varies between ﬁve and twelve years),
this implies that steady-state real GDP increases in a range of 6 to 15 per-
cent, with an estimated 8 percent increase for a country like Australia with
average schooling of ten years.
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) analyze panel data, using annual data
for twenty-one OECD countries from 1971 to 1998. They use a pooled
mean group estimator, which allows for cross-country variations in short-
run coeﬃcients, but they test for and impose homogeneity on long-run co-
eﬃcients. Their most reliable estimates suggest that the return to an addi-
tional year of schooling is a 6 percent increase in steady-state output. Table
1.1 summarizes these results.
These macroeconomic estimates refer to that part of the social returns to
schooling that is captured in GDP. It appears that these estimates are close
in magnitude to microeconomic estimates of private returns to the educa-
tion of individuals. This implies that the external eﬀects of education are
relatively small, at least in the context of the level eﬀects of education.
These conclusions must be modiﬁed, however, in the light of a series of
empirical studies that have been inspired by the hypothesis of Nelson and
Phelps (1966) that human capital may inﬂuence the rate of introduction
of new technologies. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), for example, compare
models that treat human capital as a direct input into production with
models treating human capital as an intermediate input into the acquisi-
tion of skills and/or knowledge. The former implies a relationship between
output growth and educational growth, whereas the latter implies a rela-
tionship between output growth and the average stock of human capital
per worker. Their econometric evidence favours the latter model. A more
educated workforce can more readily identify, adapt, and implement new
ideas—whether the ideas are generated domestically or overseas.
This ﬁnding, that education levels aﬀect long-run technological pro-
gress, is conﬁrmed by Frantzen (2000), who analyzes the growth of total
factor productivity (TFP) between 1961 and 1991 in the business sectors of
twenty-one OECD countries. It is also conﬁrmed by Dowrick and Rogers
(2002), who investigate the rate of technological convergence between 1970
and 1990 for a wide sample of ﬁfty-one countries and for a sample of thirty-
ﬁve relatively rich countries.
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Table 1.1 Predicted Increase in the Level of Output for an Additional Year of
Schooling in the Adult Population of an OECD Country
Study Level Eﬀect (%)
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) 6
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) 6–15These studies share a common regression speciﬁcation of the general
form
(10) TFP growth in country i    Si    Si f(pri)   ...  ,
where Si is the average years of schooling in the adult population, and pri is
the ratio of productivity in the technologically leading country relative to
country i.
The ﬁrst regression coeﬃcient,  , captures the impact of schooling on
domestic innovation. The second regression coeﬃcient,  , captures the im-
pact of schooling on the absorption of technological spillovers from the
technologically leading country.
All three studies ﬁnd that the level of schooling is a statistically signiﬁ-
cant determinant of growth. The predicted eﬀect of an additional year of
schooling in the adult population on the annual rate of growth of TFP is
   f(pri). Considering the case of Australia, where the U.S. productivity
ratio is approximately 1.5, we compare the predicted growth eﬀects of
schooling in table 1.2.
Even the lowest of these estimates predicts a highly signiﬁcant boost to
annual economic growth, one-ﬁfth of a percentage point, for every addi-
tional year of schooling.
1.4.1 Australia’s Educational Attainment Report
In the light of these estimates, it is of interest to draw up a report card on
Australia’s record of educational attainment. The data we use are taken
from Barro and Lee (2001), who have revised and updated their previous
estimates of the average years of schooling in the population aged twenty-
ﬁve and over. Figure 1.2 shows the time path of this measure for Australia
and selected OECD countries.
Forty years ago, Australian adults averaged 9.4 years of schooling, a
level of attainment that not only was signiﬁcantly above that of the other
countries illustrated, but was surpassed only by New Zealand out of the
100 countries covered by Barro and Lee. By the year 2000, Australia’s av-
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Table 1.2 Predicted Increase in Long-Run Economic Growth in Australia Due to an
Additional Year of Schooling in the Adult Population
Study Growth Eﬀect (percentage points)
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) 0.3
Frantzen (2000) 0.8
Dowrick and Rogers (2002) 0.2–0.5a
aThe lower of these estimates is derived using the coeﬃcient reported in table 2 in Dowrick
and Rogers (2002) using the full sample of countries. The higher estimate is from the coeﬃ-
cients in table 3, using the thirty-ﬁve-country sample of relatively rich economies with better
data quality.erage schooling level had climbed to 10.6 years. Attainment rose faster,
however, in all of our comparator countries, with the result that Australia
has slipped below the United States, Norway, Sweden, and Canada, is only
fractionally higher than Korea, and is only slightly higher than Japan.
Of course, the average of years of schooling is an imperfect measure of
skills and abilities, since educational quality varies across countries and
over time, and because it ignores the abilities acquired through experience
and workplace training. In the mid-1990s, twenty countries participated in
the OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey. This survey provides a
direct comparison of work-related skills, including measures of literacy
and numeracy. Figure 1.3presents a scatter plot that demonstrates that, on
either measure, Australian adults rate close to the OECD average.
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Fig. 1.2 Average years of schooling in the adult population
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).The Third International Maths and Science Study, conducted in 1994
and 1995, conﬁrms Australia’s average performance. On measures of sev-
enth-grade proﬁciency in math and science, Australian school students
ranked ﬁfteenth and twelfth respectively out of the thirty-seven country
scores reported by Barro and Lee (2001).
These international comparisons suggest that Australia’s educational
report card should be marked “Started well, but slacked oﬀ. Substantial
room for improvement.”
1.5 The Contribution of Research and Development to Economic Growth
I have already discussed the attributes of knowledge that make it signif-
icantly diﬀerent from the accumulation of items of physical capital. These
special attributes are nonrivalry and dynamic feedback. Once a new idea
has been generated, it can be used simultaneously and costlessly in many
diﬀerent processes. Furthermore, the idea can serve as an example and in-
spiration for further research.
These are the attributes of knowledge that give it the potential to drive
long-run growth. But the properties of nonrivalry and feedback also sug-
gest that the market may fail to allocate suﬃcient resources to knowledge
generation because individuals have diﬃculty in establishing and enforcing
property rights over their new ideas: Some of the beneﬁts of an innovation
are likely to accrue to others. When the private return to innovation is less
than the social return, governments need to subsidize R&D.
Paul M. Romer (1993) has argued that while governments should fund
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Fig. 1.3 Quantitative and verbal skills
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).fundamental research, it may well be appropriate for self-funding indus-
try associations to fund development and applied research—using gov-
ernments only to enforce the collection of agreed contributions.12 Weder
and Grubel (1993) expand this point in their discussion of the “Coasean”
institutions that operate in various countries to internalize knowledge
spillovers and promote technical progress. In particular, they cite the oc-
currence of three types: (1) industry associations such as the Japanese
keiretsu or Swiss Verbande; (2) conglomerate corporations, including
multinational enterprises; and (3) geographic clustering of industries, such
as Silicon Valley or the Northern Italian networks. They point particularly
to the Swiss and Japanese examples, where voluntary associations, sup-
ported by public policy, encourage long-run relationships between verti-
cally related ﬁrms and encourage joint ventures and cooperation including
joint research and training schemes.
Expenditures on R&D typically constitute, for advanced economies,
only a few percent of GDP—perhaps one-tenth of the expenditure devoted
to investment in physical equipment and structures. In a standard growth
accounting framework, variations in research eﬀort will, therefore, explain
very little of the diﬀerences in growth rates between countries. But the
point of much of the new growth theory is precisely that if knowledge spill-
overs are substantial, and if knowledge exhibits dynamic feedback ef-
fects, then even small changes in the resources devoted to the production
of knowledge may result in substantial changes in economic growth. This
point is made by Grossman and Helpman (1991), who calibrate their
model to match the U.S. growth experience. They predict that, while busi-
ness investment constitutes around 10 percent of GDP, investment in
R&D—the engine of growth—need comprise as little as 1.6 percent to
generate economic growth of 2.5 percent per year.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) surveyed some ﬁfteen previous studies
into R&D investment by U.S. ﬁrms and industries, reporting real private
rates of return averaging 25 percent. Their own econometric study of two
thousand U.S. ﬁrms revealed a 30 percent rate of return on company-
funded R&D, a “productivity premium” on basic research, and a 7 percent
return on federally funded company research. These estimates of private
rates of return on company-funded R&D are very high, given that invest-
ment in physical capital might be expected to earn a return closer to 10 per-
cent. The higher rate of return on research reﬂects, presumably, a large pre-
mium for risk and problems in diversifying or pooling such risk.
Nadiri (1993) conﬁrms that private returns to R&D are particularly high
in his review of the literature: “[N]et rates of return on own R&D of 20%
to 30% at the ﬁrm level and 10% to 30% at the industry level are reasonable
sets of estimates.” He goes on to examine spillovers to other industries and
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12. Australian agricultural research has long been funded on this basis.concludes that “The spillover eﬀects of R&D are often much larger than
the eﬀect of own R&D at the industry level....   [S]ocial rates of return of-
ten vary from 20% to over 100% with an average somewhere close to 50%”
(pp. 34–35).
A subsequent paper by Lichtenberg (1992) is one of the ﬁrst attempts at
studying the cross-country evidence on the impact of R&D expenditures
on both the level and the rate of growth of real GDP. Using a sample of sev-
enty-four countries, his growth regressions, using the neoclassical frame-
work, reveal that returns to R&D are approximately double the returns to
physical investment—a result that is broadly consistent with estimates
from the microeconomic studies of ﬁrms and industries.
Coe and Helpman (1995) try to quantify the magnitude of international
R&D spillovers. They seek to explain variations in the annual growth of
TFP for twenty-one OECD countries, plus Israel, over the period 1970–90.
Their econometric analysis ﬁnds that the stock of knowledge in one coun-
try, measured by cumulated historical R&D expenditures, raises produc-
tivity in foreign countries with which they trade. It is not clear exactly why
the extent of technology transfer should depend on the magnitude of trade
with a technologically advanced economy, although their empirical ﬁnd-
ings appear to be quite robust and have been conﬁrmed by subsequent
studies. One plausible explanation stems from the observation by Eaton
and Kortum (2001) that the high R&D economies are also the major world
exporters of capital goods. The general trade variable used by Coe and
Helpman may be acting as a proxy for the import of high-tech capital
goods for which the producers are unable to expropriate all of the rents.
Frantzen (2000) has extended the Coe and Helpman approach and pro-
vides us with estimates of rates of return on domestic R&D as well as esti-
mating the strength of international technological spillovers. He ﬁnds that
the following regression has strong statistical signiﬁcance on a sample of
twenty-one OECD countries:
The annual growth rate of TFP in the business sector, 1961 1991   0.59 
  (gross expenditure on own R&D)/(business-sector GDP)   1.52 
  SUM[(research intensity in country i)   (import share from country i)]
The ﬁrst regression coeﬃcient is an estimate of the national (social) rate
of return to R&D—capturing not only the productivity beneﬁts that ac-
crue to the ﬁrms which make the investments but also the spillover beneﬁts
that accrue to ﬁrms in the same or related industries. The second regression
coeﬃcient captures the spillover beneﬁt that a country can gain from re-
search carried out by a trading partner. This beneﬁt is proportional to the
share of imports from that country in GDP—perhaps reﬂecting the em-
bodied technological improvements in imported capital equipment.
It is instructive to compare Frantzen’s estimates with other estimates of
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estingly, he estimates a 59 percent social rate of return on national R&D
expenditures, which is close to the average ﬁgure suggested by Nadiri’s re-
view of ﬁrm- and industry-level studies. It is also close to the results of
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1996), who estimate that
the social rate of return on domestic R&D is 51 percent in the large Group
of Seven (G7) economies but 63 percent in six smaller European countries.
All of these estimates lie substantially above the various estimates of
private rates of return, implying that there are very signiﬁcant spillover
eﬀects between the ﬁrms and industries within a national economy.
The implication for Australia of the benchmark Frantzen estimate can
be calculated as follows. Our gross annual R&D expenditure (public and
private combined) of around ten billion dollars amounts to 1.5 percent of
total GDP, or approximately 2 percent of business-sector value added. An
additional billion dollars’ annual expenditure on R&D, representing one-
ﬁfth of 1 percent of value added, is predicted to increase the annual growth
rate by just over one-tenth of a percentage point.
What would happen if the countries from which Australia imports cap-
ital goods were each to increase their research intensity by 0.2 percentage
points (the same rise as in the example for Australia)? If we multiply the re-
gression coeﬃcient on foreign R&D by Australia’s total share of imports
in GDP, which is 30 percent, we ﬁnd that technology spillovers are pre-
dicted to increase Australian growth by just over one-tenth of a percentage
point. In other words, domestic R&D and spillovers from foreign R&D are
of roughly equal importance for productivity growth.
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Table 1.3 Estimated Rates of Return on R&D Expenditures
Rates of Return (%)
Private Social Cross-Country
Study and Sample Returns Returns Spillovers
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991)
Survey of ﬁfteen previous studies of U.S. 
ﬁrms and industries 25
2000 U.S. ﬁrms 30
Nadiri (1993)
Survey of ﬁfty U.S. and other studies at ﬁrm 
and industry level 20–30 50
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (1996)
GDP growth across OECD countries 51–63
Frantzen (2000)
Business-sector TFP growth across OECD 
countries 59 45a
aif the imports-GDP ratio equals 0.3.1.5.1 Australia’s Investment in Research and Development
Compared with the leading industrial economies of the OECD, Aus-
tralia invests less of its resources into R&D—and a lesser proportion of
that investment is carried out within the business sector. In ﬁgure 1.4we see
that the share of GDP devoted to R&D in Australia has been growing over
the past few decades, from under 1 percent to around 1.5 percent. Our re-
search intensity is, however, still well below that achieved by major indus-
trial economies such as Japan, the United States, and Germany, where the
R&D ratio has averaged 2.5 percent over the past twenty years. On the
other hand, Australian R&D intensity is close to or above that of Canada
and New Zealand, countries with comparably large rural sectors. R&D
intensity dipped after peaking at 1.7 percent in 1996. This is attributable in
the ﬁrst instance to a fall in R&D within the business sector of the Aus-
tralian economy, which was driven in part by the reduction in the tax con-
cession for R&D.
Even at its peak, the Australian business sector’s contribution to R&D
has been comparatively low. In ﬁgure 1.5 we see that the proportion of to-
tal R&D that is carried out in the business sector had been rising from 1981
up to 1995, from 25 percent to 51 percent, but then fell to 45 percent by
1998. In the economies that are illustrated in ﬁgure 1.6, with the exception
of Australia and New Zealand, well over half of national R&D was carried
out by the business sector.
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Fig. 1.4 Gross expenditure on R&D as % of GDP, 1981–99
Source: OECD R&D database.An interesting perspective on Australian performance on a broader
measure of “investment in knowledge” comes from OECD (2001), which
aggregates expenditures on R&D, higher education, and computer soft-
ware. On this measure, Australia ranks fourteenth out of the twenty-four
countries surveyed. In terms of the rate of growth of knowledge investment
over the 1990s, Australia ranks tenth.
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Fig. 1.5 Sectoral composition of Australian R&D
Note: The residual category is the share of private nonproﬁt R&D.
Fig. 1.6 Business enterprise R&D as a share of total (1988)
Source: OECD R&D database.1.6 Conclusions
The neoclassical revival in growth theory has had the paradoxical eﬀect
of reinforcing one of the major points of the endogenous growth revolu-
tion. The driving force of economic growth is investment in human capi-
tal—skills and ideas—rather than investment in machines and buildings.
The academic debate will no doubt continue over whether government
policies that aﬀect the rate of investment have any inﬂuence on the long-
run, as well as the short-run, rate of growth of the economy. For practical
purposes, however, if the “short run” involves a transition period of several
decades, this debate may be strictly academic—in the pejorative sense of
the word. Policies that aﬀect investment, particularly in embodied or dis-
embodied human capital, can have a sustained impact on economic
growth.
A review of empirical studies on sources of economic growth conﬁrms
these claims: Both education and R&D are important sources of growth.
In the mid-1990s, a number of studies were published claiming that there
was no systematic relationship between changes in national educational at-
tainment and changes in economic growth. Subsequent studies have, how-
ever, established that this lack of correlation was due to a mix of factors:
poor institutional performance in some less-developed economies, and a
failure to account for international variation in educational quality. Once
we account for these factors, the evidence suggests returns to education
that are consistent with microeconomic evidence on individual earnings.
An increase of one year of schooling in the average educational attainment
in the workforce, for example, can be expected to increase the long-run
level of output by around 8 percent in a typical OECD country.
These are estimates of the leveleﬀects of education. A one-oﬀincrease in
attainment will produce a one-oﬀ rise (albeit spread over time) in the level
of GDP per capita. There is mounting evidence, however, that there are
also substantial dynamic or growth eﬀects, which are linked to a country’s
ability to implement new technologies. This evidence suggests that Aus-
tralia would do well to increase its educational levels to match the OECD
leaders: the United States and Scandinavia.
One of the concerns of current public debate is that the aging of the
Australian population over the next ﬁfty years will overtax (literally and
metaphorically) the working-age population. From the perspective of
growth theory, however, there may not be so much to fear. The aging of the
demographic structure is being driven by the revolution in female educa-
tion and workforce opportunities. For the generation born in the 1930s,
only one-third of girls and one-half of boys completed high school. For the
current generation, over 70 percent of boys and close to 80 percent of girls
are completing year twelve. The past ﬁfty years have also witnessed the end
of legally enforced discrimination against women in the workforce—in the
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improvements in female education and workforce opportunities have been
major factors in the fall in fertility, which is the driving force behind the
changing age structure of the population.
The very factor that is causing the aging of the population, the revolu-
tion in women’s education, gives us reason to expect continued strong
growth of the Australian economy. The average educational attainment of
the workforce will continue to rise for the next three decades as historical
increases in school enrollments work their way through the adult popula-
tion. These eﬀects will be enhanced should educational enrollment con-
tinue to rise—particularly if the educational participation and achieve-
ment of Australia’s young men rises to meet the levels of young women.
The evidence on the beneﬁts of innovation is clear. A wide range of stud-
ies ﬁnds that private rates of return on R&D expenditures are very high,
and that social rates of return—taking account of intranational spillovers
of knowledge—are even higher.
We can summarize the potential productivity beneﬁts for Australia of
increased investment in education and research by using relatively conser-
vative benchmark estimates, based on the large number of studies that have
been summarized in this paper. Taking education ﬁrst, an increase of 0.8
in the average years of schooling of the labor force would take us to 11.4
years, the average of the levels of attainment in North America and Scan-
dinavia. The eﬀect on the Australian economy would be an increase of one-
third of a percentage point in the annual growth rate—coming both
through human capital deepening and more rapid adoption of new tech-
nologies.13
Turning to investment in R&D, it is probably unrealistic to suppose that
Australia will match the research intensity of the world leaders such as the
United States or Germany. Adopting a more realistic role model, France,
would require that an extra 0.6 percent of GDP be devoted to R&D—tak-
ing research intensity from 1.6 percent to 2.2 percent. Using a conservative
estimate of the social rate of return,14 the impact on the Australian econ-
omy would be an increase of one-quarter of a percentage point in the an-
nual rate of productivity growth.
To sum up, positive prospects for continuing strong productivity growth
will be enhanced if Australia emulates the higher rates of investment in
knowledge—both in education and in R&D—that we observe in the lead-
ing OECD economies. An increasingly well-educated (albeit shrinking)
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13. From table 1.1, the conservative estimate of the level eﬀect is 0.8   6 percent   0.048,
which is equivalent to 0.0012 per year over forty years. From table 1.2, a conservative estimate
of dynamic eﬀect is 0.8   0.003   0.0024 per year. The two eﬀects sum to 0.0036, or 0.36 per-
centage points per year.
14. Assuming the social rate of return is 0.4, which is substantially below the estimates sum-
marized in table 3.workforce, operating in an economy that continues to be open to trade in
goods and ideas, will be well placed to identify, introduce, and manage the
new technologies that will emerge over the next few decades.
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Comment John Leahy
This paper provides a nice survey of the literature on knowledge and
growth. At the heart of the discussion is the contrasting role played by
knowledge in traditional growth theory and in the “new” growth theory.
In the traditional theory, as reformulated in the 1990s, knowledge is em-
bodied in human capital. As its name suggests, human capital is just an-
other form of capital. Human capital, like physical capital, is accumulated
through investment, in this case investment in education. Like physical
capital, it is subject to diminishing returns; given the supplies of the other
factors, each additional unit of education adds a bit less to aggregate pro-
duction. Modeling knowledge in this way does very little to alter the im-
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the National Bureau of Economic Research.plications of traditional growth models, namely that accumulation of fac-
tors is subject to diminishing returns and does little to raise growth in the
long run.
New growth theory makes two challenges to the traditional theory. First,
by assuming constant returns to accumulable factors, it challenges the as-
sumption that growth is exogenous in the long run. Second, by reinter-
preting knowledge as ideas rather than human capital, it opens the door for
the modeling of a number of interesting externalities.
While much has been made of the ﬁrst challenge, I agree with Dowrick
that the important contribution of the new growth literature lies in the rein-
terpretation of the role of knowledge and the novel externalities that arise.
Endogenous growth depends on functional form assumptions that are
convenient mathematically but for which we have no empirical evidence.
We have no idea what would happen if suddenly the world found itself with
twice the physical capital and twice the human capital, since this event has
not yet happened.
The interpretation of knowledge as ideas has several implications that
are relevant for public policy. First, ideas, unlike human capital, are non-
rival. Absent legal restrictions, the fact that one person has an idea doesnot
prevent others from having or using the same idea. The social returns to de-
veloping a new idea may therefore exceed the private return. The optimal
government response may be to subsidize research. On the other hand,
new ways of doing things tend to replace old ways of doing things. This cre-
ative destruction may mean that social returns are actually lower than
private returns. Innovators do not take into consideration the losses to oth-
ers that their innovations create. In such a case, the optimal government re-
sponse would be to tax innovation.
The important question for public policymakers regards the size of these
eﬀects. The paper does a good job of surveying the empirical literature.
Current studies tend to ﬁnd large spillovers. Education in one country ap-
pears to raise productivity at home and abroad. The returns to R&D ap-
pear great, but the social returns appear greater still. These results appear
to justify large subsidies to education and research and development.
At this point, I believe that the author could have been a bit more skep-
tical. I have severe doubts concerning both the magnitude and the inter-
pretation of these results. As concerns interpretation, it is very diﬃcult to
identify a causal link between education and growth, let alone external
eﬀects of education within a country or the spillovers onto other countries.
Not only may causality be reversed—with growth providing the resources
for greater education—but countries with the foresight to educate their
population probably get a lot of other things right as well. They may be
more stable or have lower discount rates or better tax policy. They may sub-
sidize other activities related to knowledge creation. They may have social
systems that reward eﬀort at all levels. It is very diﬃcult to identify the
38 Steve Dowrickeﬀect of an exogenous shift in human capital induced by a government sub-
sidy to education. Most studies do not even attempt to use instrumental
variables, probably because there are few valid instruments.
The other problem is that some of the estimated eﬀects are implausibly
large. Most of the R&D studies cited in the paper ﬁnd private rates of re-
turn in the neighborhood of 25 percent. This raises the question “Why are
private agents not doing more R&D?” Firms appear to be leaving a lot of
money on the table. Maybe, however, these returns are overstated and gov-
ernment-subsidized or -funded projects would yield substantially less. One
possibility is that these estimates capture average rather than marginal
rates of return. For example, economic research is valuable, but would
doubling the money spent on economic research double the output of eco-
nomic knowledge? Probably not. Another possibility is survivorship bias.
We may not measure correctly all of the money spent on projects that don’t
pan out. Firms that fail are often dropped from the sample. In the end, the
7 percent return cited on federally funded R&D makes one wonder if poli-
cies would yield such amazing results.
In my mind, generating convincing estimates of the size of the external-
ities emphasized by the new growth literature remains one of the more im-
portant tasks facing growth economics.
Comment Andrew K. Rose
Steve Dowrick has given us a long, thorough, but focused survey of educa-
tion and growth. He gives a ﬁne summary of the theoretical literature that
has obsessed much of the macroeconomics profession for the 1990s and
concludes that the issue of whether growth is better modeled as being en-
dogenous or exogenous may not actually be that relevant in practice. More
important to my mind, he has also provided a number of estimates from
both the micro- and macroeconomic literatures on the eﬀects of education
on output, and he concludes that they are large, even for an advanced
OECD country like Australia. He believes there are large externalities and
that the case for government intervention is secure. I agree with most of
what he says, which seems reasonable in both the small and the large.
My personal view is that a survey like this should always focus precisely
on a well-deﬁned question. In this case, Dowrick is interested in answers to
the question “What is the return to an additional year of education?” This
creates a convenient taxonomy to organize the empirical estimates from
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tional Bureau of Economic Research.the literature. It is divided into micro- and macroeconomic estimates at
three levels: (1) the returns to the individual; (2) the returns to the nation,
which may well be higher if there are externalities; and (3) the returns to the
world, which may be higher still if there are foreign externalities. Of course,
there is also the possibility of negative externalities, and Dowrick consid-
ers the costs of extra education which also play into the analysis.
In future work like this, I would like to see more emphasis placed on the
externalities themselves. How much do we really know from quantiﬁable
microeconomic evidence on the existence of large positive externalities?
Since this is where the real case for policy intervention lies, I personally
would feel more conﬁdent if I could cite a number of reliable studies that
present strong evidence of positive externalities.
The reason I would ﬁnd this is reassuring lies in the magnitudes of the re-
turns to education cited. Almost all the returns to education and R&D are
high—huge, in fact. It makes me feel that I’ve personally underinvested!
More generally, the returns are so high that they strain plausibility. Lots of
education is wasted, and much R&D might well be unproductive—is it all
being taken into account? Let me put it another way. The returns are so
large that the question of the paper’s title is almost irrelevant, since the is-
sue of levels versus growth rate eﬀects is a sideshow if the returns are so
high. So is concern for underinvestment in education, if the personal re-
turns are as high as cited.
I also believe there is a lot of scope in this area for a comprehensive meta-
analysis. This is the increasingly accepted way to conduct a quantitative
survey. The author chooses a coeﬃcient of interest that has been estimated
in a number of papers—for instance, the value of a marginal year of edu-
cation. Each paper contributes a single observation of this underlying vari-
able, and the resulting vector of estimates is treated as the dependent var-
iable. The characteristics of the studies are treated as the regressors.
Meta-analysis like this might enable us to understand the sources of varia-
tion in the estimates of the returns to education, and enable us to handle
them with more conﬁdence.
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